Matthew Gabel

Matthew Gabel, Norman Foster, Judith Heidebrink, Roger Higdon, for the Pilot PET Study Group

Archives of Neurology, 2010, 67 (12): 1506-1512.

 Abstract: The clinical diagnosis of dementing diseases largely depends upon the subjective interpretation of patient symptoms. Consensus panels are frequently used in research to determine diagnoses when definitive pathological findings are unavailable.  Nevertheless, research on group decision-making indicates many factors can adversely influence panel performance.   In this study, we examine empirically the performance of consensus panels in diagnosing dementia and compare it with that of individual experts.  We find that using a modified Delphi protocol to arrive at a consensus diagnosis is a reasonable substitute for pathologic information. This protocol improves diagnostic accuracy and certainty when panelist judgments differ and is easily adapted to other research and clinical settings while avoiding potential pitfalls of group decision-making.

Judicial Behavior under Politcial Constraints 

Clifford Carrubba, Matthew Gabel, and Charles Hankla
American Political Science Review, 2008
Abstract: The actual impact of judicial decisions often depends on the behavior of executive and legislative bodies that implement the rulings. Consequently, when a court hears a case involving the interests of those controlling the executive and legislative institutions, those interests can threaten to obstruct the court's intended outcome. In this paper, we evaluate whether and to what extent such constraints shape judicial rulings. Specifically, we examine how threats of non-compliance and legislative over-ride influence decisions by the European Court of Justice (ECJ). Based on a statistical analysis of a novel dataset of ECJ rulings, we find that the preferences of member-state governments-whose interests are central to threats of non-compliance and over-ride-have a systematic and substantively important impact on ECJ decisions.
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Estimating the Effect of Elite Communications on Public Opinion Using Instrumental Variables
Matthew Gabel and Kenneth Scheve
American Journal of Political Science, 2007
Abstract: A central question in the study of democratic polities is the extent to which elite opinions about public policy shapes and potentially manipulates public opinion on those issues. Estimating the impact of elites on mass opinion is difficult because of endogeneity, omitted variables, and measurement error. This paper proposes an identification strategy for estimating the causal effect of elite messages on public support for European integration employing changes in political institutions as instrumental variables. The paper presents three main empirical results. Frist, we find that more negative elite messages about European integration do indeed decrease public support for Europe. Our analysis suggests that OLS estimates are biased, underestimating the magnitude of the effect of elite messages by fifty percent. Second, we find no evidence that this effect of elite messages vareis for more political aware individuals. Thirid, our estimates are inconsistent with a mainstreaming effect in which political awareness increases support for Europe in those political settings in which elites have a favorable consensus on the benefits of integration. This result is in sharp contrast to the OLS analysis that incorrectly suggests a mainstreaming effect.
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