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## POLITICAL SCIENCE 537

### DEMOCRACY, RESPONSIVENESS, AND ACCOUNTABILITY

When examining democratic regimes, we are often willing to accept the vague notion that representation involves a congruence between the preferences of citizens and policy outcomes. On closer inspection, it is clear that there is a complex chain of institutions that link citizens to actual government action. Those institutions both shape the choices that actors make and aggregate their eventual choices to produce decisions. Our goals in this course include exploring, in detail, many of those institutional linkages and how variations in them leads to differences in representation across democratic regimes. Specific topics and readings are detailed below. The readings we will discuss jointly are not sufficient to motivate a piece of original research, and, thus, as you begin to define a research topic, you will need to do additional readings on your own. I can help identify appropriate readings if you find you need assistance.

### Assignments

**Participation.** You must come to class every week fully prepared and you must participate extensively in class discussions. Of course, useful participation requires a thorough understanding of the readings. To help you focus on the appropriate theoretical, methodological, and substantive issues, I have prepared a note-taking template that you should complete for each reading. Make two copies of your note-taking templates, one to keep for yourself and one to turn in. I have put an asterisk by the readings for which you must turn in your notes, but I encourage you to complete one for each reading.

Though I have no expectation that discussion will ever wane, you should fully expect to be called on whether you are volunteering or not. We may experiment with other techniques of generating participation as well. For example, after arriving at class you may be assigned to present a work as if we were at a professional conference or to critique a work as if you were an anonymous reviewer for a refereed journal.

Each week a team of three students will be assigned to lead discussion. I strongly encourage the teams to plan carefully how they will motivate discussion. Credit will be given for any innovation that evokes thoughtful discussion of how the week's readings are related to one another and to the rest of the course.

Not being part of the week's leadership team does not mean that you have the week off. To the contrary, in evaluating your participation I will place relatively more weight on your note-taking and oral participation when you are *not* leading the discussion.

These aspects of participation combined account for 30% of your final grade.

Discussion Leaders:

Tuesday, January 31, 2012 : Theories of Representation

Chen, Walsh, Krehbiel

Tuesday, February 7, 2012: Citizens' Preferences and Mass Opinion

Demirkaya, Schnose, Figueroa Schibber

Tuesday, February 14, 2012: From Preferences to Votes

Erkan, Lucardi, Rangel Alfaro

Tuesday, February 21, 2012: From Preferences to the Menu of Choices

Chen, Demirkaya, Erkan

Tuesday, February 28, 2012 : The "Spatial" Distribution of Votes

Figueroa Schibber, Krehbiel, Lucardi

Tuesday, March 6, 2012: From Votes to Seats

Rangel Alfaro, Schnose, Walsh

Tuesday, March 20, 2012: Pivotal Players by Regime Types

Chen, Erkan, Krehbiel

Tuesday, March 27, 2012: Measures of Representatives' Ideal Points

Rangel Alfaro, Walsh, Demirkaya

Tuesday, April 3, 2012: Alternate Measures of Representatives' Ideal Points

Figueroa Schibber, Lucardi Schnose

Tuesday April 10, 2012: Congruence

Chen, Walsh, Krehbiel

Tuesday April 17, 2012: Policy Outcomes

Demirkaya, Schnose, Figueroa Schibber

Tuesday April 24, 2012: Retrospective Accountability

Erkan, Lucardi, Rangel Alfaro

**Research Design.** Each of you will prepare a Doctoral Dissertation Research Improvement Grant (as if) for submission to the National Science Foundation. A research design is a systematic plan that motivates and puts in context your research question, makes clear your hypotheses and the logic behind them, and details the scientific process you will use to address them, including how you will collect and analyze the appropriate data. It can only be completed once you are intimately engaged with the material. In other words, do not consider the research design as a starting point. Think of the proposal as a highly detailed overview of a major research project, perhaps without the detailed data analysis (though preliminary empirical analysis can often serve to prove the a project is worthwhile and manageable). A completed draft of your DDRIG is due Friday, March 9, and it will account for 15% of your grade. I will provide you examples of successful DDRIG's recently submitted by WashU graduate students.

I will play the part of the National Science Foundation's Political Science Program Director, and you will serve as my external reviewers. You will each receive three DDRIGs which you will evaluate for intellectual merit. A single-blind review process is actually used by the NSF, but we probably won't be able to manage that. Still, I encourage the external reviewers to be frank (and courteous) as the primary investigator submitting the proposal can benefit from your suggestions (and my grading of your evaluations will be based on their quality). Your external reviews may be loosely based on the note-taking guide you use weekly to evaluate works. Your evaluations will account for 20% of your grade, and they are due Friday, April 6.

The National Science Foundation does not invite primary investigators to revise and resubmit. Still, an encouraging and constructive set of reviews may lead the scholar in question to make changes to the proposal and submit it again in a future round. You will have the opportunity to revise your DDRIG based on the initial round of external reviews. Your revised DDRIG is due Monday, April 30, and it will account for 15% of your final grade. Please include a memo detailing how you responded to the initial reviews.

A compelling grant proposal must be motivated by a review of a coherent literature that justifies the project being proposed. Thus, to aid you in completing the final proposal an annotated bibliography will be due on Friday, February 17. You should provide a brief review of at least six works related to your research question. Again, the individual reviews might take the form of the note-taking template you use weekly. Works that are required readings can be included in addition to the original six. The bibliography should be fronted by two or three paragraphs defining what makes this a coherent literature, stating explicitly your research question, and explaining how the works reviewed serve to motivate your question. The annotated bibliography will account for 20% of your grade.

### Recommended Book Purchases:

Cox, Gary W. 1997. *Making Votes Count*. Cambridge University Press, New York, NY.

Pitkin, Hanna. 1972. *The Concept of Representation*. University of California Press, Los Angeles, CA

Powell, Jr., G. Bingham. 2000. *Elections as Instruments of Democracy*. Yale University Press, New Haven, CT.

Shugart, Matthew Soberg and John M. Carey, 1992. *Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics* Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, MA.

## COURSE SCHEDULE

Tuesday, January 17, 2012:

### The Chain of Responsiveness

Stimson, James, Michael Mackuen and Robert Erikson, 1995. "Dynamic Representation." *American Political Science Review* 89(3):543-565.

Powell Jr., G. Bingham, 2004. "The Chain of Responsiveness." *Journal of Democracy* 15(4):91-105.

Tuesday, January 24, 2012:

### How to Design a Major Research Project

Manheim, Jarol B., Richard C. Rich, and Lars Willnat. 2002. *Empirical Political Analysis: Research Methods in Political Science*. 5th ed. New York: Longman Publishers. (Chapter 1)

SBE Doctoral Dissertation Research Improvement Grants (SBE DDRIG), Program Solicitation, NSF 11-547, 2011, National Science Foundation: Division of Social, Behavioral and Economic Research, Social and Political Science Program, Washington, D.C.

Driscoll, Amanda, 2010. "Doctoral Dissertation Research in Political Science: Judicial Reform and Court Curbing in Comparative Perspective," National Science Foundation: Division of Social, Behavioral and Economic Research, Social and Political Science Program, Washington, D.C., SES # 1024055.

O'Brien, Diana, 2010. "Doctoral Dissertation Research in Political Science: When Women Matter: Exploring Theoretical Links Between Women Descriptive and Substantive Representation," National Science Foundation: Division of Social, Behavioral and Economic Research, Social and Political Science Program, Washington, D.C., SES # 1024388.

Potter, Joshua. 2011. "Doctoral Dissertation Research in Political Science: Party Entry and Voter Coordination Across Electoral Systems: A Natural Experiment," National Science Foundation: Division of Social, Behavioral and Economic Research, Social and Political Science Program, Washington, D.C., SES # 1124469.

Tuesday, January 31, 2012 :

### Theories of Representation

Pitkin, Hanna P., 1972. *The Concept of Representation*. University of California Press, Los Angeles, CA. Read chapters 3 & 7, skim chapters 4,5,6

Miller, Edward E. and Donald Stokes, 1963. "Constituency Influence in Congress." *American Political Science Review* 57(1): 45-56.

Powell Jr., G. Bingham Jr., 2004. "Political Representation in Comparative Politics." *Annual Review of Political Science* 7: 273-96.

Manin, Bernard, Adam Przeworski and Susan C. Stokes. 1999. "Elections and Representation." In *Democracy, Accountability, and Representation*, ed. Adam Przeworski, Susan C. Stokes, and Bernard Manin. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

\*Schwindt-Bayer, Leslie A. and William Mishler. 2005. "An Integrated Model of Women's Representation." *Journal of Politics* 67(2): 407-248.

Tuesday, February 7, 2012:

### Citizens' Preferences and Mass Opinion

- Converse, Phillip, 2006. "The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics (1964).", *Critical Review* 18:(1-3) 1-74.
- Zaller, John and Stanley Feldman, 1992. "A simple theory of the survey response." *American Journal of Political Science* 36: 579-616.
- \*Hill, Jennifer, and Hanspeter Kriesi, 2001. "An Extension and Test of Converse's "Black and White" Model of Response Stability." *American Political Science Review* 95(20): 397-413.
- \*Erikson, Robert S., Michael B. MacKuen, and James A. Stimson, 2002. *The Macro Polity*. New York: Cambridge University Press. Skim chapters 1,3,4,7, read chapters 10-11
- \*Duch, Raymond M., and Randolph T. Stevenson. 2006. "Assessing the Magnitude of the Economic Vote Over Time and Across Nations." *British Journal of Political Science* 25: 528-47.
- Gabel, Matthew J. and Kenneth Scheve, 2007. "Estimating the Effect of Elite Communications on Public Opinion Using Instrumental Variables." *American Journal of Political Science* 51(4): 1013-28.

Tuesday, February 14, 2012:

### From Preferences to Votes

- Cox, Gary W. 1997. *Making Votes Count*. Cambridge University Press, New York, NY.  
Read chapters 3-7.
- \*Singer, M.M., Stephenson, L.B., 2009. "The political context and Duverger's theory: evidence at the district level." *Electoral Studies* 28, 480-491.
- \*Abramson, Paul R. et al., 2009. "Comparing strategic voting under FPTP and PR." *Comparative Political Studies* 43 (1): 61-90.
- Crisp, Brian F., Santiago Olivella, and Joshua D. Potter. Forthcoming. "Characteristics of Electoral Contexts that Impede Voter Coordination." *Electoral Studies* x(x):xxx-xxx.
- Tavits, Margit. 2005. "The Development of Stable Party Support: Electoral Dynamics in Post-Communist Europe." *American Journal of Political Science* 49(2): 283-298.
- Golder, Matthew, 2006. "Presidential Coattails and Legislative Fragmentation." *American Journal of Political Science* 50(1): 34-48.

Friday, February 17:

### Annotated Bibliographies Due

Tuesday, February 21, 2012:

### From Preferences to the Menu of Choices

- Cox, Gary W. 1997. *Making Votes Count*. New York: Cambridge University Press.  
Read chapters 8-12.
- \*Tavits, Margit. 2008. "Party Systems in the Making: The Emergence and Success of New Parties in New Democracies." *British Journal of Political Science* 38(2008):113-133.
- Crisp, Brian F., Joshua D. Potter, and John J.W. Lee. Forthcoming. "Entry and Coordination in Mixed-Member Systems: A Controlled Comparison Testing the Contamination Hypothesis." *The Journal of Politics* 74(2):xxx-xxx.
- \*Brancati, Dawn. 2007. "The Origins and Strengths of Regional Parties." *British Journal of Political Science* 38(1): 135-159.

Tuesday, February 28, 2012 :

### The “Spatial” Distribution of Votes

- \*Rodden, Jonathan, 2010. “The Geographic Distribution of Political Preferences.” *Annual Review of Political Science* 13: 297–340.
- Calvo, Ernesto and Timothy Hellwig, 2011. “Centripetal and Centrifugal Incentives under Different Electoral Systems.” *American Journal of Political Science* 55(1): 27-41.
- \*Gallagher, Michael, 1991. “Proportionality, Disproportionality, and Electoral Systems.” *Electoral Studies* 10(1): 33-51.
- Ezrow, Lawrence, 2007. “The Variance Matters: How Party Systems Represent the Preferences of Voters.” *The Journal of Politics* 69(1): 182-192.
- Benoit, Kenneth, 2000. “Which Electoral Formula is the Most Proportional? A New Look with New Evidence.” *Political Analysis* 8(4): 381-388.

Tuesday, March 6, 2012:

### From Votes to Seats

- Taagepera, Rein and Mathew Soberg Shugart, 1989. *Seats and Votes: The Effects and Determinants of Electoral Systems*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. (Skim all)
- Taagepera, Rein, 2007. *Predicting Party Sizes: The Logic of Simple Electoral Systems*. Oxford University Press, Oxford. Chapters 7 and 13.
- \*Carey, John M. and Simon Hix, 2011. “The Electoral Sweet Spot: Low-Magnitude Proportional Electoral Systems.” *American Journal of Political Science* 55(2):383-397.
- \*Samuels, David, and Richard Snyder, 2001. “The Value of the Vote: Malapportionment in Comparative Perspective.” *British Journal of Political Science* 31(2001): 651-671.
- Shugart, Matthew Soberg, 2005. “Comparative Electoral Systems Research.” In Gallagher, Michael and Paul Mitchell, eds., *The Politics of Electoral Systems*, pp. 25-56. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Friday, March 9:

Initial Doctoral Dissertation Research Improvement Grants Due

Tuesday, March 13: Spring Break

Tuesday, March 20, 2012:

### Pivotal Players by Regime Types

- Shugart, Matthew Soberg and John M. Carey, 1992. *Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics*. New York: Cambridge University Press. Read chapters 3,7,8,11, skim rest.
- \*Calvo, Ernesto, 2007. “The Responsive Legislature: Public Opinion and Law Making in a Highly Disciplined Legislature.” *British Journal of Political Science* 37(2): 263-280.
- Samuels, David and Matthew S. Shugart, 2003. “Presidentialism, Elections and Representation.” *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 15(1):33-60.
- \*Wiesehomeier, Nina and Kenneth Benoit, 2009. “Presidents, Parties and Policy Competition.” *Journal of Politics* 71: 1435-1447.
- Krehbiel, Keith, 1996. “Institutional and Partisan Sources of Gridlock: A Theory of Divided and Unified Government.” *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 8(1): 7-40.
- Tsebelis, George, 1995. “Decision Making in Political Systems: Veto Players in Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, Multicameralism and Multipartyism.” *British Journal of Political Science* 25(3): 289-325.

Tuesday, March 27, 2012:

### Measures of Representatives' Ideal Points

- Clinton, Joshua, Simon Jackman, and Douglas Rivers, 2004. "The Statistical Analysis of Roll Call Data." *American Political Science Review* 98 (2): 355–70.
- \*Hug, Simon S., 2006, "Selection Effects in Roll Call Votes British Journal of Political Science," *CIS Working Paper No. 15* 40(1): 225-235
- Carrubba, Clifford, Matthew J. Gabel and Simon S. Hug , 2008. "Legislative Voting Behavior, Seen and Unseen: A Theory of Roll-Call Vote Selection." *Legislative Studies Quarterly*. 33(4):543-572.
- Crisp, Brian F. and Amanda Driscoll. Forthcoming. "The Strategic Use of Legislative Voting Procedures." *Legislative Studies Quarterly*. x(x):xxx-xxx.
- \*Carey, John M., 2007. "Competing Principals, Political Institutions, and Party Unity in Legislative Voting." *American Journal of Political Science* 51(1):92-107.
- Desposato, Scott W., 2006. "The Impact of Electoral Rules on Legislative Parties: Lessons from the Brazilian Senate and Chamber of Deputies." *Journal of Politics* 68(4):1018-1030.

Tuesday, April 3, 2012:

### Alternate Measures of Representatives' Ideal Points

- Alemán, Eduardo, Ernesto Calvo, Mark P. Jones and Noah Kaplan, 2009. "Comparing Cosponsorship and Roll-Call Ideal Points" *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 34(1):87-116.
- Desposato, Scott W., Matt Kearney and Brian F. Crisp. 2012. "Using Co-Sponsorship to Measure Ideal Points." *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 36(4):531-565.
- \*Crisp, Brian F., Kristin Kanthak, Jenny Leijonhufvud, 2004. "The Reputations Legislators Build: With Whom Should Representatives Collaborate?" *American Political Science Review* 98(4):703-716.
- \*Saiegh, Sebastián, 2009. "Recovering a Basic Space from Elite Surveys: Evidence from Latin America," *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 34(1):117-145.
- Laver, Michael, Kenneth Benoit and John Garry, 2003. "Extracting Policy Positions from Political Texts Using Words as Data." *American Political Science Review* 97(2):311-331.
- Lowe, Will, 2008. "Understanding Wordscores" *Political Analysis* 16(4): 356-371.

Friday, April 6:

### External Reviews of Doctoral Dissertation Research Improvement Grants Due

Tuesday April 10, 2012:

### Policy Outcomes

- Johnson, Gregg B. and Brian F. Crisp, 2003. "Mandates, Powers, and Policies." *American Journal of Political Science* 47(1): 127-141.
- Shepsle, Kenneth, Robert P. Van Houweling, Samuel J. Abrams and Peter C. Hanson, 2009. "The Senate Electoral Cycle and Bicameral Appropriations Politics." *American Journal of Political Science* 53(2):343-359.
- Crisp, Brian F., Scott W. Desposato and Kristin Kanthak 2011. "Legislative Pivots, Presidential Powers, and Policy Stability." *Journal of Law, Economics and Organization* 27(2):426-452.
- \*Hallerberg, Mark, 2004. "Executive Authority, the Personal Vote, and Budget Discipline in Latin American and Caribbean Countries." *American Journal of Political Science* 48(3): 571-587.
- \*Alt, James.E. and David Dryer Lassen, 2006. "Transparency, political polarization, and political budget cycles in OECD countries." *American Journal of Political Science* 50(3):530–550.

Tuesday April 17, 2012:

### Congruence

- Powell Jr., G. Bingham, 2000. *Elections as Instruments of Democracy*. Yale University Press, New Haven, CT. (Read Chapters 1, 10, 7, Skim Chapters 8-9.)
- Golder, Matthew and Jacek Stramski. 2010. "Ideological Congruence and Electoral Institutions." *American Journal of Political Science* 54(4): 90-106.
- Lax, Jeffrey, and Justin H. Phillips, 2012. "The Democratic Deficit in the States." *American Journal of Political Science*. 56(1): x-xx.
- \*Luna, Pablo and Elizabeth J. Zechmeister, 2005. "Representation in Latin America: A Study of Elite-Mass Congruence in 9 Countries." *Comparative Political Studies* 38(4): 388-416.
- \*Bailey, Michael A., 2007. "Comparable Preference Estimates across Time and Institutions for the Court, Congress, and Presidency." *American Journal of Political Science* 51(3): 433-448.
- Powell Jr., G. Bingham, 2009. "The Ideological Congruence Controversy: The Impact of Alternative Measures, Data, and Time Periods on the Effects of Election Rules." *Comparative Political Studies* 44(2011): 1675-1699.

Tuesday April 24, 2012:

### Retrospective Accountability

- Fearon, James, 1999. "Electoral Accountability and the Control of Politicians: Selecting Good Types versus Sanctioning Poor Performance." In *Democracy, Accountability, and Representation*, ed. Adam Przeworski, Susan C. Stokes, and Bernard Manin. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Converse, Phillip, 2000. "Assessing the Capacity of Mass Electorates." *Annual Review of Political Science* 3(1):331-353.
- Cheibub, José Antonio and Adam Przeworski, 1999. "Democracy, Elections and Accountability for Economic Outcomes." In *Democracy, Accountability, and Representation*, ed. Adam Przeworski, Susan C. Stokes, and Bernard Manin. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- \*Samuels, David, 2004. "Presidentialism and Accountability for the Economy in Comparative Perspective." *American Political Science Review* 98(3):425-436.
- Tavits, Margit. 2007. "Principal versus Pragmatism: Policy Shifts and Political Competition." *American Journal of Political Science* 51(1):151-165.
- \*Crisp, Brian F. and Joshua D. Potter, Santiago Olivella and William Mishler, 2012. "Corruption and Retrospective Democratic Accountability." *Working Paper* January 2012.

Monday, April 30:

Revised Doctoral Dissertation Research Improvement Grants Due