Global Political Economy  
Political Science 4731--Fall 2011

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Siegle 237, By appointment

*I consider that a man’s brain originally is like a little empty attic, and you have to stock it with such furniture as you choose. A fool takes in all the lumber of every sort that he comes across, so that the knowledge which might be useful to him gets crowded out, or at best jumbled up with a lot of other things, so that he has difficulty in laying his hands upon it. Now the skillful workman is very careful indeed as to what he takes into his brain-attic. He will have nothing but the tools which may help him in doing his work, but of those he has an assortment, and all in the most perfect order. It is a mistake to think that little room has elastic walls and can distend to any extent. Depend upon it there comes a time when for every addition of knowledge you forget something that you knew before. It is of the highest importance, therefore, not to have useless facts elbowing out the useful ones. (Sherlock Holmes)*

Thirty years ago some investigators studying international relations argued for a separate discipline, implicitly suggesting the politics of international relations were fundamentally different from those of the rest of Political Science. At that time, the *high* politics of security and conflict dominated academic IR, not unnatural given issues of national survival in a nuclear world captured the attention of many. The nation-state was the primary unit of analysis and non-state actors were often ignored in research. The *low* politics of GPE took a back seat as great power politics dominated IR. Even those who viewed IR as a field in Political Science more often than not bypassed frameworks of political behavior prevalent in other fields. This is ironic given IR introduced approaches and tools such as game theory, dynamic modeling, and sophisticated statistical techniques to Political Science.

But in the 1970-80s, investigators began to systematically and increasingly broach the barriers separating IR from the rest of Political Science. In particular, the study of international or global political economy has changed tremendously over the past twenty years. The demise of east-west tensions, the end of the Cold War, increasing global competition, globalization, and complex interdependence prompted many investigators to shift substantive focus, theoretical approach, unit of analysis, and method. Governments remain key, but they now share explanatory space with sub-national actors such as interest groups, unions, bureaucracies, civil society, social movements, industry, and other civic associations. The role of institutions has become a key source of explanatory power. Research agendas in international and comparative political economy increasingly overlap. With greater and greater frequency, investigators of comparative and global political economy employ common independent variables even as their dependent variables differ. I find this development exciting as we build models of political behavior that can apply across fields. We will consider important issues, but in so doing we will focus on the design of social research. This should help you develop an appreciation for important questions in political life, and a toolkit for evaluating and conducting research.
**Requirements:**

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<th>Participation</th>
<th>Approximately 30%</th>
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<td>Nine weekly papers</td>
<td>Approximately 20%</td>
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<td>Research design</td>
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**Readings:** The required readings are listed below. Some of the readings are available at the campus bookstore. Some are available on the course Telesis site—indicated by a (*). The articles listed--indicated by a (**)--you can access via JSTOR. I selected the readings to provide a broad exposure to theory and empirical method in modern global political economy. I recommend becoming familiar with the history of global political economic relations. History offers a laboratory and data. Using models of political behavior independent of history and context can prove pathological or nonsensical.

Required books:
- Garrett, *Partisan Politics in the Global Economy*
- Hayes, *Globalization and the New Politics of Embedded Liberalism*
- Okun, *Equality and Efficiency*
- O’Rourke and Williamson, *Globalization and History*
- Rodrik, *Has Globalization Gone Too Far?*

**Weekly papers:** I ask you to submit a one-two page paper on the readings for nine weeks of readings. The weeks are up to you, but do not rear load your papers as you may discover you do not have enough weeks left to fulfill this requirement. Some weeks I will pose a question for you related to the reading. Other weeks you should raise a question that arises from the reading and flush out a discussion of that question.

**Participation:** I will lead the seminar, but I strongly encourage class participation—notice the portion of your grade related to participation. The best learning and research is collegial and interactive. I urge you to participate in class, ask questions and engage your colleagues in a discussion. You will likely discover that your best teachers in class are your colleagues. A good discussion involves give and take among the members of the seminar. Moreover, you will discover that if the professor has to talk for the entire seminar you will become disengaged (e.g. bored). As you think about the readings a good strategy would be to break a reading down into its important substantive issues, primary theoretical argument, plausible alternative theoretical explanations, and then the empirical strategies employed by the investigator. Be sure to consider possible ways to improve and build on the research presented as we are engaged in a cumulative endeavor as social scientists.

**Research design:** We are always concerned about the design of social research. Research design affects the type of data you need to test theories, where you look for information, what cases to study, how you obtain information without creating bias that contaminates your results, and whether empirical measures and tests correspond to theoretical arguments. Research design is essential to determining the internal validity of research and the ability to generalize findings to new settings. Good investigators use research design to attempt to control for confounding explanations, threats to validity, and counterfactuals.
You will construct a research design over the course of the semester related to a question that interests you in global political economy. This is not an easy task, and for many of you this will be the first time you attempt to produce a research design, but this could become a skill you use elsewhere in life. For example, a dissertation prospectus and research grant proposals are simply research designs. You will produce your design in steps. Here is the timetable for producing the design:

Week 3: 1-2 pages that introduce the question you propose to study. Why is it interesting, why is it important, what is the motivation?

Week 5: 4-5 pages of the different/competing theoretical frameworks approaching your question

Week 7: 4-5 pages survey of the relevant strands of literature. Place your question from week 3 and the different/competing theoretical frameworks from week 5 in the literature.

Week 10: 4-5 pages of what you intend to add to the literature, your theoretical take, along with some testable hypotheses

Week 13: 3 pages outlining a plausible empirical strategy to enable you to test your hypotheses and choose among the competing explanations. What data—quantitative or qualitative—might be necessary to assess the competing hypotheses and how would you obtain that data and 3 pages on expected results

Week 15: Put all the above parts together and then summarize with a final 2-3 pages with what problems you might anticipate encountering in conducting your research.

I. Recurring theme of distribution: Equality vs. efficiency

II. Globalization in history
   O'Rourke and Williamson, *Globalization and History*, 2000, Chapters 1-4, 7-9, 13

III. Social traps
   Fallacy of composition and unexpected consequences
   *Thomas C. Schelling, *Micromotives and Macrobehavior*, 1978, Chapters 1, 3, 7

   Market failure: collective action and signaling
   *Mancur Olson, *The Rise and Decline of Nations*, Chapters 1-3

   Market failure: hierarchy
Market failure: hierarchy (Continued)

Market failure: institutions and process
*Douglass North, *Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance*, 1990, Chapters 1-8

IV. Comparative advantage, mobility, cleavages and coalitions, disciplining mechanisms

Comparative advantage, etc. (Continued)

V. Globalization, mobility, convergence, and the social welfare state
Labor markets and redistributive burdens
Rodrick, *Has Globalization Gone Too Far?* 1997

Labor markets and redistributive burdens (Continued)

Modern social welfare state

Parties and redistributive policies
*Carles Boix, *Political Parties, Growth and Equality*, Chapters 1-4