Professor Dan Butler has published a new article in the journal, Legislative Studies Quarterly. The article, titled, "Legislative Control and Partisan Disparities in Dyadic Representation," looks at how politicians in legislative sessions often vote with their party over their constituents' preferences, and how those votes are influenced by party leadership. 

Butler, and his co-authors Zoe Nemerever (Auburn) and Steven Rogers (Saint Louis University), investigate "how partisan control of the legislative chamber affects state legislators' voting behavior using district-level returns on veto-referendum ballot initiatives."

Read the abstract below and the full article in Legislative Studies Quarterly.

Abstract:

Prior work finds that U.S. legislators often misrepresent their constituents' preferences, with politicians often siding with their party over their own constituents' preferences. To explain this misrepresentation, district-level characteristics receive more attention than what happens within the legislature. We argue that insights about legislative leadership can help us understand the conditions under which politicians may vote against their constituents' preferences. We investigate how partisan control of the legislative chamber affects state legislators' voting behavior using district-level returns on veto-referendum ballot initiatives. Our analyses reveal differences in dyadic representation based on which party controls the legislative chamber. When Republicans control the chamber, they allow their members to face more cross-pressured votes, partially explaining why Republicans are more prone to voting against constituents' preferences. Our results demonstrate the need to better understand the role of party leaders in shaping partisan differences in the quality of representation.