Itai Sened

Professor Emeritus of Political Science
PHD, University of Rochester
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    • Washington University
    • MSC 1063-228-207
    • One Brookings Drive
    • St. Louis, MO 63130-4899
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    A typical product of the Rochester Ph.D. program of the late 1980's, Itai Sened is currently Professor of the Department of Political Science at Washington University in St. Louis. His main interests are theory of institutions, game theory and applied mathematical modeling. His book The Political Institution of Property Rights, was published by Cambridge University Press in 1997. His second book, Political Bargaining: Theory, Process and Practice with Gideon Doron was published in 2001 by Sage Publications. His third book, Multiparty Parliaments, with Norman Schofield is forthcoming with Cambridge University Press. He is the co-editor, with Jack Knight, of Explaining Social Institutions from The University of Michigan Press (1995, now in a paperback new edition). He has also published articles in The American Journal of Political Science, The Journal of Politics, The Journal of Theoretical Politics and numerous other refereed journals as well as different edited volumes. He is currently working on several different projects, most notably two: (1) A book manuscript entitled Uncovering Politics: Political Bargaining and Majority Rule?s Principle Constraint, with William T. Bianco and (2) A series of articles on development and economic growth in transition democracies.

    Selected Publications


    • J. Knight and I. Sened (Eds.) 1995. Explaining Social Institutions, Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press.Itai Sened. 1997. The Political Institution of Private Property. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Gideon Doron and Itai Sened. 2001. Political Bargaining: Theory Practice and Process. London: Sage Publications.
    • Norman Schofield and Itai Sened. 2006. Multiparty Democracy: Parties, Elections and Legislative Politics in Multiparty Systems, Cambridge University Press.

    Edited Special Issues of Scientific Journals

    • G. Doron and I. Sened (Ed.) "Coalition Theory and Political Bargaining," a special issue of The Journal of Theoretical Politics, Vol. 7, No. 3, 1995.

    Articles in Refereed Publications

    • S. Mishal D. Schmeidler and I. Sened. 1990. "Israel and the PLO: A Game with Differencial Information," in Tatsuro Ichiich, Abraham Neyman and Yair Tauman (Eds.): Proceedings of the International Conference on Game Theory and Applications, 1987 Academic Press.
    • T. J. Feddersen, I. Sened and Stephen G. Wright. 1990. "Rational Voting and Candidate Entry Under Plurality Rule," American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 34, No. 4: 1005-1016. W. H. Riker and Itai Sened. 1991. "A Political Theory of the Origin of Property Rights," American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 35, No. 4: 951-969.

      - Reprinted in Alston L. J., T. Eggertsson and D. C. North (Eds.) Empirical Studies in Institutional Change. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1995.
    • I. Sened. 1991. "Contemporary Theory of Institutions in Perspective." The Journal of Theoretical Politics, Vol. 3, No. 4: 379-402.
    • S. H. Ainsworth and I. Sened. 1993: "The Role of Lobbyists: Entrepreneurs with Two Audiences," American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 37, No. 3: 834-866.


    1984 - Dean's List Award, Tel-Aviv University
    1985 - B.A. Magna Cum Laude in Political Science and Philosophy, Tel-Aviv University
    1986 - Fulbright Award, U.S. - Israel Educational Foundation
    1990-1991 - Post Doctoral Fellowship, The Center in Political Economy, Washington University, St Louis
    1991-1994 - The Allon Grant, Tel Aviv University
    1993-1994 - Dean's Special Grant, Tel Aviv University
    1995 - Phi Sigma Alpha award for best paper, The Midwest Convention, Chicago



    Introduction to Comparative Politics
    Israeli Politics
    Politics and the Theory of Games


    Seminar in Political Theory: Collective Choice I
    Seminar in Political Theory: Collective Choice II