Andrew Reeves

Professor of Political Science
Director of the Weidenbaum Center on the Economy, Government, and Public Policy

contact info:

Email: reeves@wustl.edu
Phone: 314-935-5856

mailing address:

Washington University
MSC 1063-228-249
One Brookings Drive
St. Louis, MO 63130-4899

Professor Reeves' research examines the interchange between institutions and behavior with a focus on political accountability in the United States.

Reeves' work has appeared in the American Political Science Review, the American Journal of Political Science, and the Journal of Politics, among other outlets. He received his PhD from the Department of Government at Harvard where he was an associate of the Institute for Quantitative Social Science. His book, The Particularistic President: Executive Branch Politics and Political Inequality with Douglas Kriner (Cambridge University Press) was the winner of the 2016 Richard E. Neustadt Award.

in the news:

6.21.23

Andrew Reeves published in Presidential Studies Quarterly

4.19.23

WashU’s Weidenbaum Center joins Harvard’s peer pre-review consortium

10.27.21

Professor Andrew Reeves on Partisanship, the economy and presidential accountability

9.20.21

Professor Reeves and PhD Candidate Zoe Ang Published in American Journal of Political Science

No Blank Check: The Origins and Consequences of Public Antipathy towards Presidential Power

By Andrew Reeves

Concerns about unaccountable executive power have featured recurrently in political debates from the American founding to today. For many, presidents’ use of unilateral power threatens American democracy. No Blank Check advances a new perspective: Instead of finding Americans apathetic towards how presidents exercise power, it shows the public is deeply concerned with core democratic values. Drawing on data from original surveys, innovative experiments, historical polls, and contexts outside the United States, the book highlights Americans’ skepticism towards presidential power. This skepticism results in a public that punishes unilaterally minded presidents and the policies they pursue. By departing from existing theories of presidential power which acknowledge only institutional constraints, this timely and revealing book demonstrates the public’s capacity to tame the unilateral impulses of even the most ambitious presidents. Ultimately, when it comes to exercising power, the public does not hand the president a blank check.